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Abstract 
Individual’s expected wages exceed predicted market wages. Rational expectations imply the 
divergence should be zero. If individuals over-estimate the return from their attributes and 
view the paid-employment return distribution too favourably, then conditional on market 
wages, subsequent employment utility is likely to be low through disappointment. 
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1. Introduction and background 
Expectations play a crucial role in determining individual decision making in economics. More 
recently, increasing attention has focused on unrealistic expectations, with an ever expanding 
literature on the influences of optimism on aspects of decision making, such as, stock market 
investments (Puri and Robinson, 2007) and occupational choice (Arabsheibani et al., 2000). 
 
Despite this emerging literature few, if any, studies within the economics discourse have 
analysed the role of optimism on individual utility. This paper tests the hypothesis that 
employment utility depends not only on current earnings, but upon an individual’s optimistic 
bias concerning earnings expectations prior to becoming employed. In the context of this study, 
optimism is the extent to which wage expectations are upwardly biased, which conforms to the 
formal definition of optimism used in economics whereby there are systematically biased 
beliefs in the probability of favourable outcomes (Hey, 1984). 
 
Under rational expectations agents’ predictions are equal to statistically derived true expected 
values, therefore within labour markets, wage expectations are a perfect reflection of the 
distribution of market wages and, therefore, an accurate representation of the value the labour 
market places on individual characteristics. However, this requires that workers possess 
accurate private information concerning their attributes. For humans, this is problematic as 
almost everyone overestimates their own ability (Weinstein, 1980). When individuals hold 
homogenous optimistic beliefs about their abilities, they view an upwardly biased distribution 
of market wages which stochastically dominates the true market distribution. On the one hand, 
the anticipation of positive future financial outcomes allows individuals to take immediate 
pleasure in their future success. In this view, Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) argue that people 
choose to be optimistic because the anticipatory utility outweighs any cost in realized 
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outcomes. Alternatively, optimists in entering the labour market are more likely to suffer a 
discrepancy between actual and expected earnings, influencing job satisfaction through 
disappointment (Bell, 1985). In line with the latter prediction, the results provided in this paper 
suggest that optimism substantially reduces employment utility, especially satisfaction with 
pay.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a nationally-representative annual survey of 
more than 5,000 households containing approximately 10,000 individuals aged 16 or over and 
has been used extensively for applied longitudinal research. Households are re-interviewed 
annually, and 18 annual waves of data are available from 1991 to 2008. Within the BHPS if 
the respondent ‘is not currently working but has looked for work or has not looked for work in 
last four weeks but would like a job’, he/she is asked: ‘About how many hours in a week do you 
think you would be able to work?’ Individuals are then asked about expected wages: ‘What 
weekly take-home pay would you expect to get (for that)?’ From these responses, we construct 
an hourly expected wage, itE . Given the reference to ‘take home pay’, and in the spirit of Brown 
and Taylor (2013), it is assumed that responses refer to the net expected wage. Out of the final 
sample around 40% of respondents are unemployed with the remainder being classified as 
economically inactive.1 We include the economically inactive in the sample if they report an 
expected wage as this is interpreted as a signal of labour market attachment. In order to derive 
our optimism measure we also construct for this sample of unemployed or economically 
inactive individuals (denoted by a 𝑈 superscript), a predicted market wage, ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑈.The predicted 
market wage is constructed following Prasad (2003) and  Hogan (2004) by estimating a pooled 
                                                          
1 Major inactive groups are those in family care, those that are full-time students and those classified as long-term 
sick/disabled. 
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OLS log of  net hourly earnings equation for all  employees (denoted by an E superscript) in 
the dataset who have one or less than one year of current job tenure. The wage equation is 
formally shown in equation (1), where 𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝐸  is the log of net hourly wages of employees, 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐸  is 
a vector of employee characteristics and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the usual random error term.
 2   
 
𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝐸 = 𝜌′𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐸 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡          (1) 
?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑈 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?
′𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑈 
 
The estimated coefficients ?̂?  are then used to predict the market wage for our group of 
unemployed or economically inactive individuals based upon their vector of 
characteristics, 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑈, such that 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑈 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐸   The expected wage 𝐸𝑖𝑡 and the predicted wage   ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑈 
are then used to construct our measure of optimism. As individual responses concerning wage 
expectations are likely to be noisy estimates and influenced by the individual’s environment, 
to increase the precision in estimating optimism, the panel feature of the data is exploited. The 
procedure is formally illustrated in equation (2), which is estimated as a linear fixed-effects 
regression, where 𝑋 is a vector of demographic and other person specific characteristics that 
influence 𝐸𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖 is the individual fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a random error term.
3 
        
log (𝐸)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑈 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
 
                                                          
2 The vector of employee characteristics for the wage equation includes age, age squared, gender, a set of highest 
educational attainment dummies, ethnicity, marital status, dummies for physical and mental health condition and 
also a set of regional and year controls. Sample selection into employment is controlled for by estimating equation 
(1) using a Heckman selection model and including an inverse Mills ratio in the equation, where the over-
identifying instruments are the number of children in household and whether the respondent’s partner is employed. 
The results are consistent with standard findings in the earnings literature: we observe a substantial gender pay 
gap (around 13% lower pay for women) and an ethnicity pay gap, while better educated employees earn 
significantly higher wages. The same is the case for married employees compared to non-married ones. Finally, 
adverse health conditions are associated with substantially lower pay.   
3 See Table 1 for the complete set of control variables in the model.  
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Optimism is the individual fixed-effect extracted from equation (2), which provides individual-
varying estimates of the forecast error between an individual’s subjective expected wage and 
their corresponding predicted market wage, averaged over a number of periods and excluding 
the marginal impact of any time-varying environmental influences that cannot be directly 
controlled for in the second-stage job satisfaction equations.  Optimistic individuals have 
higher subjective wage expectations than they should, therefore conditional on the predicted 
market wage control, optimists will have a correspondingly higher fixed-effect.4 Our optimism 
measure is constructed for individuals who are classified as economically inactive or 
unemployed but who subsequently become employees later in the panel.5 This gives us a total 
of 7,298 responses from 4,077 individuals on which our optimism variable is constructed. 
Figure 1 illustrates the kernel probability density function of the natural logarithm of expected 
and predicted market wages for our sample. The mean log expected wage (1.46) is larger than 
the mean predicted market wage (1.42), suggesting wage expectations are in the main 
optimistic. Table 1 reports the results from our optimism equation. Briefly, expectations are 
qualitatively rational in the sense that those with the highest predicted market wages are more 
likely to expect higher wages. Also, age is inversely related to optimism. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
                                                          
4 A possible argument is that the predicted wage may give biased estimates of the likely distribution of wages 
facing our sample of unemployed or economically inactive individuals. For example, our sample of individuals 
who have one or less than one year of current job tenure will include people who were never unemployed and 
have simply moved from one job to another. In this instance our predicted wage will be upwardly biased. The real 
interest however is in relative optimism between individuals and a general bias in the predicted wage does not 
affect this property. 
5 To deal with multiple transitions out of inactivity/unemployment and into employment per individual, we focus 
our analysis only on the first observable transition to ensure optimism is constructed for individuals prior to entry 
into paid-employment.  
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To explore the association between optimism and utility, job satisfaction equations are 
estimated for this pooled sample of paid-employees who were unemployed or economically 
inactive when their optimism was estimated. Responses for the job satisfaction questions for 
employees within the BHPS are given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘not satisfied at 
all’ to ‘completely satisfied’. We focus our analysis on job satisfaction with pay and overall 
job satisfaction, as optimism in this context is capturing an upwardly biased perception of 
labour market returns, which is likely to primarily impact upon satisfaction with pay and 
subsequently spill-over into overall job satisfaction. In total we have 10,289 paid-employed 
observations from 1,937 individuals. Formal tests of optimism and utility are described in the 
second-stage regression equation presented in equation (3), where 𝑈𝑖𝑡 is utility,  ?̂?𝑖  is our 
optimism scale which corresponds to the standardised fixed-effects extracted from equation 
(2), 𝑤𝑖𝑡 is the employees individual hourly wage in log form and 𝑋 is a vector of demographic 
and other personal or job specific characteristics of individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡.6 Therefore, we test 
for a negative 𝛾.  
 
  
𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾?̂?𝑖 + 𝜎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
 
It could be argued that under rational expectations ?̂?𝑖 is simply capturing unobserved private 
information about earnings power. Prior optimism will therefore be positively correlated with 
subsequent employee earnings. Given rational expectations, it follows that conditional on 
current earnings in paid-employment, 𝛾 is zero.7 All job satisfaction models are estimated as 
linear correlated random effects models (following Mundlak, 1978) which include the 
                                                          
6 See Table 2 for the complete set of control variables in the model.  
7 A further test to eliminate the concern that under rational expectations measured optimism is simply capturing 
private information about earnings power and, specifically, that measured optimism may proxy for earnings below 
what the individual’s characteristics justify, is to include the residual from equation (1) in the job satisfaction 
equations. Following this procedure leads to no change in the estimate of 𝛾 and the imputed residual from equation 
(1) is statistically insignificant in the regressions. 
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individual means of the time-varying covariates to account for other sources of time invariant 
individual heterogeneity. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Table 2 reports the job satisfaction equations. Columns 1 and 2 present the key coefficients for 
overall job satisfaction and with satisfaction with pay. As hypothesised, optimism is strongly 
and negatively associated with both dimensions of paid-employment utility at the 1% level. 
These effects are not small. The most optimistic of employees (+2.5 standard deviations from 
the mean) have a satisfaction with pay score some 9.5% less than the least optimistic (-2.5 
standard deviations from the mean). For overall job satisfaction the corresponding effect is 
smaller at approximately 5.5%. Importantly though, if optimists had the same job satisfaction 
with pay as everyone else, would optimism have any real effect on overall job satisfaction? To 
test this hypothesis we include satisfaction with pay as a control in an overall job satisfaction 
equation.  The results in column 3 of Table 2 show that the optimism coefficient is no longer 
statistically significant, suggesting that optimists’ dissatisfaction with pay drives the overall 
job satisfaction effect.8  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8  Optimism measured as 𝑧𝑖  from equation (2) allows us to capture an individual’s underlying tendency to 
overestimate their prospects net of any time-varying environmental factors. One possible objection to this 
procedure is that by removing the impact of environmental factors we may lose useful information on how wage 
expectations are formed, information which is potentially relevant for subsequent job-satisfaction. As a robustness 
check we repeat the analysis using two additional optimism measures which do not exclude the impact of time-
varying environmental influences. Firstly, we construct an optimism measure which is the raw difference between 
the individuals expected wage and the predicted market wage. Secondly, we construct an optimism measure which 
is the fixed effect from equation (2) with the inclusion of the fitted values. These measures of optimism produce 
results which are wholly consistent with those presented in Table 2.    
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4. Conclusion 
 
While traditional economic theory assumes rational or even pseudo-rational human behaviour, 
a growing mass of behavioural economists continue to note substantial human divergences 
from rationality, including optimism. Our empirical investigation reveals that such divergences 
can actually be harmful to an individual’s employment utility. In particular, individuals who 
are excessively optimistic about their abilities and as such view the paid-employment return 
distribution too favourably are more likely to have lower job satisfaction once a wage-earner, 
with the optimism effect being especially large for job satisfaction with pay. Future research 
should analyse the effects of excessively optimistic beliefs on other, broader measures of 
subjective well-being, as these results imply - counter to the predictions of Brunnermeier and 
Parker (2005) -  that any anticipatory utility derived from being an optimist is likely to be 
outweighed by disappointment.  
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimation of log wage expectations and log predicted market 
wages 
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Table 1: Fixed effects model for log of expected hourly wage 
  
Variables Coefficients 
  
Predicted market wage (Log) 0.593*** 
  
Age (base: 15-24)  
25-34 -0.063* 
35-44 -0.144*** 
45-54 -0.241*** 
55-64 -0.245*** 
Education (base: no qualifications)  
Degree -0.159 
Further Education -0.112 
A Levels -0.137* 
O Levels -0.074 
Other Qualifications 0.060 
  
Married or Cohabiting -0.053** 
Number of children  0.026* 
Household Size -0.006 
Mental Health Condition 0.058** 
Physical Health Condition 0.027 
Type of status (base: unemployed)  
Family care -0.022 
FT student -0.051 
LT sick 0.051 
Other inactivity status -0.017 
  
Years in status 0.002 
Years in status sq.  0.00003 
Household Labour Income (log) -0.002 
Household Investment Income (log) -0.002 
Household Benefit Income (log) 0.002 
Rent/Mortgage Costs (log) -0.0003 
  
Observations 7,298 
Number of persons 4,077 
R-squared (within) 0.177 
R-squared (overall) 0.192 
Notes:  Models also include dummies for region and survey year; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; standard errors are obtained via clustered bootstrapping.  
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Table 2: Correlated random effects models of job satisfaction 
  
Overall job 
satisfaction 
Satisfaction with 
pay 
Overall job 
satisfaction 
Optimism -0.061*** -0.094*** -0.025 
 [0.022] [0.029] [0.017] 
Satisfaction with pay   0.371*** 
   [0.010] 
    
Female 0.113** 0.146** 0.063 
 [0.056] [0.068] [0.046] 
White 0.129 0.260*** 0.018 
 [0.098] [0.101] [0.081] 
Age -0.011 -0.020 -0.003 
 [0.019] [0.024] [0.018] 
Age squared 0.037 0.072** 0.010 
 [0.024] [0.029] [0.021] 
Number of cigarettes per day 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] 
Married or cohabiting -0.003 0.056 -0.023 
 [0.050] [0.060] [0.045] 
Number of children 0.070** 0.087** 0.038 
 [0.030] [0.034] [0.025] 
Household Size 0.022 0.029 0.011 
 [0.021] [0.025] [0.019] 
Mental Health Condition -0.129 0.111 -0.170** 
 [0.084] [0.082] [0.074] 
Physical Health Condition 0.002 -0.004 0.004 
 [0.038] [0.045] [0.033] 
    
Education (Ref: No qualifications)    
Degree -0.783*** -0.410 -0.632** 
 [0.291] [0.293] [0.251] 
Further Education -0.446*** -0.261 -0.351** 
 [0.168] [0.171] [0.140] 
A Levels -0.393** -0.312 -0.277* 
 [0.186] [0.201] [0.159] 
O Levels -0.334 -0.041 -0.319* 
 [0.209] [0.233] [0.164] 
Other Qualifications -0.425* -0.346 -0.297 
 [0.250] [0.323] [0.201] 
    
Weekly usual hours -0.011 -0.013 -0.007 
 [0.007] [0.009] [0.006] 
Weekly usual hours squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Paid overtime hours 0.007* 0.028*** -0.003 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] 
Unpaid overtime hours -0.000 -0.013*** 0.004 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Manager/Foreman/Supervisor 0.036 0.057 0.015 
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 [0.040] [0.042] [0.035] 
Holding second job -0.097* 0.020 -0.105** 
 [0.058] [0.071] [0.051] 
Permanent contract 0.054 -0.145** 0.108* 
 [0.061] [0.072] [0.056] 
Promotion opportunities 0.386*** 0.251*** 0.293*** 
 [0.038] [0.038] [0.033] 
Pay includes bonus or profit share 0.036 0.094** 0.001 
 [0.036] [0.041] [0.033] 
Member of employer pension scheme 0.115** 0.117** 0.072 
 [0.050] [0.052] [0.047] 
Pay includes annual increments 0.170*** 0.149*** 0.115*** 
 [0.032] [0.036] [0.028] 
Shift work -0.116* 0.055 -0.136** 
 [0.066] [0.082] [0.067] 
Tenure in years -0.094*** -0.075*** -0.066*** 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] 
Tenure squared 0.337*** 0.272*** 0.236*** 
 [0.075] [0.087] [0.058] 
Log of Hourly Net Wage 0.160** 1.016*** -0.216*** 
 [0.063] [0.073] [0.055] 
Wage in previous employment 0.003 -0.004 0.004 
 [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] 
    
Trade union status (Ref: Not covered)    
Covered non-member -0.023 0.132** -0.072 
 [0.049] [0.055] [0.050] 
Covered member -0.042 -0.009 -0.038 
 [0.063] [0.074] [0.061] 
    
Work location (Ref: employer’s premises)    
Work Location - Home 0.104 0.496*** -0.080 
 [0.161] [0.191] [0.177] 
Work Location - Other 0.032 -0.006 0.035 
 [0.065] [0.080] [0.059] 
Work Location - Driving/Travel -0.060 -0.126 -0.013 
 [0.067] [0.086] [0.061] 
    
    
Workplace size (Ref: 500+)    
Workplace Size 1-50 0.126** -0.011 0.131** 
 [0.063] [0.076] [0.059] 
Workplace Size 50-499 0.103* -0.046 0.119** 
 [0.060] [0.071] [0.057] 
    
Sector (Ref: Private firm)    
Civil service 0.123 -0.082 0.154 
 [0.168] [0.169] [0.144] 
Local government 0.118 0.044 0.102 
 [0.092] [0.125] [0.084] 
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Other public 0.019 -0.035 0.032 
 [0.122] [0.136] [0.110] 
Non-profit 0.299*** 0.301** 0.188* 
 [0.112] [0.129] [0.102] 
    
Observations 10,289 10,289 10,289 
Number of persons 1,937 1,937 1,937 
 
Notes: The models also include controls for occupation category, industry, and a set of regional and year 
controls; the individual means of all the above listed time-varying covariates are also included in all models; 
standard errors obtained via clustered bootstrapping in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
